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INTRODUCTION
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty constitutes an important juncture for
the EU, which merits a strategic reflection about the objectives and priorities of
CSDP. When and where should the EU contribute, or even take the lead, in
conflict prevention, conflict resolution and crisis management, with its full
range of diplomatic, civilian and military instruments? That ought to be deter-
mined by a more complete European Security Strategy (ESS) – the grand strategy
– that outlines the EU’s fundamental objective and its vital interests, by the for-
eign policy priorities flowing from that grand strategy, and by the EU’s specific
interests and objectives vis-à-vis an issue or region.
On this point, EU strategic thinking is the least explicit. While there are many
strategic documents elaborating on various dimensions of the ESS – e.g. on the
Neighbourhood, on Africa, on WMD, on terrorism – there is no specific strategy
for CSDP. Hence there is a missing link between the vague yet ambitious goal
expressed in the ESS – “to share in the responsibility for global security” – and
the practice of CSDP operations and capability development. Because the over-
all goal of the ESS has not been translated into clear objectives and priorities,
CSDP to some extent operates in a strategic void. The guidance that does exist,
offers only some elements of strategy: it concerns form rather than substance.
The Petersberg Tasks give an indication of the types of operations that the EU
can undertake, and the Headline Goal of the scale of the capabilities that Mem-
ber States are willing to commit – but that does not tell us when and where the
EU needs to intervene. Furthermore, as we shall see, even about the types of
operations and the scale of the effort, some ambiguities are consciously kept
alive by certain actors.
Until now CSDP has thus been a bottom-up undertaking, the capabilities being
developed and the operations undertaken gradually generating indications of
what might evolve into a strategy, rather than being guided by a strategy. A more
explicit security and defence strategy is now required to give more direction to
CSDP. Otherwise Member States cannot ensure that scarce resources and lim-
ited capabilities are consistently focussed on commonly identified priorities. In
any case there are, sadly, too many conflicts and crises for the EU to deal effec-
tively with all of them, especially in a leading role. Therefore, as the 2008 Report
on the Implementation of the ESS states, “We need to prioritise our commit-
ments, in line with resources”. This holds especially true at a time when as a
consequence of the economic and financial crisis defence budgets across Europe
are under severe pressure and every Euro spent on defence must – rightly – be
justified to taxpayers. The reverse is also true, however: if it wants to remainA STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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credible, the EU must commit the necessary resources, in line with its priorities
and ambitions.
Three dimensions must thus be considered in any CSDP-strategy: priorities and
objectives, the types of operations that can potentially be undertaken to meet
those, and the capabilities to be committed to that end. In this Egmont Paper,
we will argue that the building-blocks are already available – it remains for the
EU to construct the edifice. We are grateful to the many colleagues, practitioners
as well as academics, who inspired us, and wish in particular to thank the fol-
lowing colleagues for their insights and comments on the first draft: Bastian
Giegerich (Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr), Alexandra Jonas
(Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr), Alexander Mattelaer (Vrije
Universiteit Brussel), Thomas Renard (Egmont), James Rogers (University of
Cambridge), Luis Simón (Royal Holloway University), and Nicolai von
Ondarza (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik). A fine team of architects indeed.
Sven Biscop & Jo Coelmont1
1.  Prof. Dr. Sven Biscop is director of the Europe in the World Programme at Egmont and visiting profes-
sor at the College of Europe in Bruges and at Ghent University. Brig-Gen. (R) Jo Coelmont, former Bel-
gian representative to the EU Military Committee, is a senior associate fellow in the same programme.5
LESSONS LEARNED FROM CSDP OPERATIONS
The EU has not remained idle, witness the long list of past and present opera-
tions. But an assessment of CSDP operations so far will demonstrate that Gray’s
strong argument for a clear strategy applies as much to the EU as to any other
actor:
“Defence planning needs to be based on political guidance, and that gui-
dance should make its assumptions explicit. Sometimes we neglect this,
and the oversight can prove costly. Conditions, which is to say contexts,
can change, and so should the working assumptions behind policy. You
can forget what your assumptions have been if you forgot to make them
explicit”.2
Overview of Past and Current Operations
The EU has so far completed four military operations:
– Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
(2003), following up on a NATO operation, to assist the peaceful implemen-
tation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, with a force of 350.
– Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (2003), to stabilize the
area around the city of Bunia in the east of the country, with a force of 1800.
– EUFOR RD Congo (2006), to provide stability during the presidential elec-
tions, with a force of 2300.
– EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008-9), to protect refugees, facilitate humanitarian
aid, and assist the work of the UN, with a force of 3700.
It has also completed six civilian-military missions:3
– EUJUST Themis in Georgia (2004-5), to assist with the reform of the crimi-
nal justice system, with a dozen experts.
– EUPOL Proxima in the FYROM (2004-5), to assist the country’s police, with
a force of some 200 police and civilian officials.
– EU support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (2005-7), a mixed civil-
ian-military operation proving advice, training and transport, with some 50
civilian and military personnel.
– EUPAT in the FYROM (2006), a follow-up mission to Proxima of some 30
police advisors.
2.  Colin S. Gray, “The 21st Century Environment and the Future of War”. In: Parameters, Winter 2008-
2009, pp. 15-16.
3.  In reality, some of the civilian missions are military operations in all but name, and are implemented
by military personnel in civilian dress, but have been labelled civilian for political reasons.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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– Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia (2005-6), monitoring the implemen-
tation of the peace agreement between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Move-
ment (GAM), with some 80 monitors.
– EUPOL Kinshasa in the DRC (2005-7), supporting the Integrated Police Unit
of the country’s national police in the transition period, with some 30 police
advisors.
Three military operations are ongoing:
– EUFOR Althea in Bosnia (since 2004), following up on a NATO operation,
to stabilize the country after the civil war, with a force that has now been
down-sized to 1950.
– EUNAVFOR Atalanta (since 2008), to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia,
with a force of 1800 manning 4 frigates and various other vessels and air-
craft.
– EUTM Somalia (since 2010), to train Somali security forces in Uganda, with
some 150 personnel.
Finally, eleven civilian-military missions are ongoing as well:
– EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 2003), following on to the UN’s
Integrated Police Task Force to assist the country reforming its police, with
a force of 280.
– EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine (since 2005), assisting both countries with
border management, with a force of 200.
– EUSEC in the DRC (since 2005), an SSR mission with some 50 staff.
– EUJUST LEX for Iraq (since 2005), training criminal justice officials with
some 40 staff.
– EUBAM Rafah in the Palestinian Territories (since 2005), monitoring the
border crossing point between Gaza and Egypt with some 25 staff.
– EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories (since 2006), to assist the
police, with some 100 staff.
– EUPOL in the DRC (since 2007), a follow-up mission to EUPOL Kinshasa,
assisting the country’s police, with some 60 staff.
– EUPOL in Afghanistan (since 2007), assisting the country’s police, with
some 450 staff.
– EUMM in Georgia (since 2008), monitoring the implementation of the Six
Point Agreement between Georgia and Russia, with some 400 monitors.
– EULEX Kosovo (since 2008), assisting the country in the police, judiciary
and customs areas, including some executive tasks, with some 1700 interna-
tional and 1100 local staff.
– EU SSR in Guinea Bissau (since 2008), an SSR mission with some 16 staff.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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A Lack of Strategy
The list above demonstrates that the EU is certainly active. What is far from
clear though is the strategic rationale behind these operations. That does not
mean that these operations have been undertaken for the wrong reasons or have
been useless. As Howorth puts it, “The record to date is nothing to be ashamed
of. Every operation so far undertaken has its underlying raison d’être. None has
been embarked on flippantly or for the wrong reasons”.4 If it had not been for
the EU, most Member States would in all probability not have had a policy at
all on many of these issues. Most operations are of smaller scale and limited
duration, with very circumscribed objectives, but not therefore without political
or military risk. Moreover, they have been successful in realizing the objectives
set. Nevertheless, the lack of strategic guidance does have consequences.
First, if each individual operation has been justified, without a clear overall
strategy it is difficult to assess the prioritization of the EU’s engagement: why is
one operation chosen over another? The 2008-9 operation in Chad and the Cen-
tral African Republic e.g. achieved its objectives and contributed to the protec-
tion of displaced persons from neighbouring Darfur. In the same period however
the EU could with equally good reason have intervened to safeguard human
security and protect populations in Eastern Congo – where it was in fact asked
to do so by the UN.
Second, in the absence of a strategic framework, the ad hoc nature of decision-
making is reinforced. A strategy ought to offer a platform for proactive engage-
ment, with the aim of preventing the need for coercive measures in the first
place. Without it, CSDP is mostly reactive, and the specific interests of some
Member State (for historical reasons e.g.) play a larger role in the launching of
operations, in particular when they are holding the Presidency, as do elements
such as the political salience and media coverage of situations. The EU and its
Member States have not, and indeed will not flippantly embark on an operation,
to borrow Howorth’s phrase – for that, the deployment of armed forces is too
weighty a decision under any set of circumstances. But a strong ad hoc character
does create the risk that while each operation undertaken is in itself useful and
necessary, the EU does not necessarily undertake the most useful, timely, and
necessary operations, i.e. those where its interests are most at stake. Although
all CSDP operations are launched by unanimous decision-making in the Coun-
cil, some operations have nevertheless attracted criticism from a number of
Member States – belatedly, one should say – who doubt whether EU interests
4.  Jolyon Howorth, Strategy and the Importance of Defence Cooperation among EU Member States.
Security Policy Brief No. 12. Brussels, Egmont, 2010, p. 3.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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are concerned. It is clearly apparent that the more obviously an operation con-
cerns broad EU interests, the smoother the force generation proceeds, whereas
otherwise it can become a painful process. Atalanta, vital to the protection of
shipping lanes, is an example of the former, with Initial Operating Capability
being reached on 13 December 2008 after two force generation conferences in
November, although one has to admit that naval assets are more readily availa-
ble, and that Member States are more ready to participate in generally less risky
naval operations, than to deploy already heavily committed land forces. An
example of the latter is provided by EUFOR Chad/CAR, criticized in various
corners for serving French rather than EU interests, requiring five force genera-
tion conferences between November 2007 and January 2008 before reaching
Initial Operating Capability in March 2008.
Third, if the strategic objectives of an intervention are not spelled out, it is dif-
ficult to assess its success beyond the tactical and operational level. In some
cases, part of the motivation to launch an operation has also been to test CSDP
procedures and capabilities; a justified objective but of course no substitute for
the definition of the actual strategic objective. Again, EUFOR Chad/CAR can
serve to illustrate the point: European forces successfully achieved their objec-
tives of protecting refugees, facilitating humanitarian aid, and assisting the work
of the UN during their presence in theatre, before handing over to a UN force.
But those are short term objectives – it is not clear what the long term, strategic
objectives of the EU’s deployment in the region are or even whether the EU has
strategic objectives in the region at all. Often only the end-date of an operation
is defined rather than the desired end-state, or only a tactical but not the political
end-state is defined. Deploying without strategy means launching an operation
without having a roadmap towards the desired political end-state in the long
term – sometimes even without knowing the desired end-state at all.
The launching of twenty-four operations in the short time since its creation in
1999 is testimony to the remarkably rapid development of CSDP. At present, the
momentum seems to be decreasing, however, as the appetite for new operations
has decreased, although the threats and challenges have not disappeared – quite
the opposite. The overall lesson learned must be that if CSDP is detached from
foreign policy strategy and operations are undertaken without reference to stra-
tegic priorities, it cannot but remain a limited and reactive instrument. A CSDP
strategy is an essential part of CFSP and overall EU foreign policy, if coherence
within the EU is the aim.9
THE BENEFITS OF A CSDP STRATEGY
Of course, decision-making on crisis management in general and on military
operations in particular will always be to a significant extent ad hoc – that fol-
lows from the nature of crisis. It is evidently impossible – and indeed undesirable
– to produce a rigid strategic framework that would contain the answer – to act
or not to act – to every crisis with which the EU is confronted, especially when
deploying the military may be required. What is possible though is to produce a
strategic framework, a CSDP strategy that, starting from the EU’s vital interests,
an analysis of the threats and challenges, and EU foreign policy priorities, out-
lines: the priority regions and issues for CSDP and, in function of the long-term
political objectives and the appropriate political roadmap for those regions and
issues, scenarios in which launching an operation could be appropriate.
Such a strategic framework is not to stifle, but to aid flexible decision-making;
it is a tool at the disposal of the High Representative and the Member States in
the Council to help structure the debate and decision-making about operations.
Translating the EU’s vital interests into a strategy for CSDP will be of immediate
help in prioritizing EU deployments, in choosing which operation to undertake
and which not – a necessity in view of the limited deployable capabilities. It
ought also to be the basis for a proactive policy, guided by the Council and
piloted by the High Representative, in function of the long-term objectives of
foreign policy, seeking to prevent crises or escalation thereof in areas related to
vital interests and foreign policy priorities, rather than merely reacting to events.
In line with the ESS, such a proactive policy will be preventive, multilateral and
holistic, putting to use all instruments at the disposal of the EU, of which CSDP
is an integral part. Having a CSDP strategy does not mean of course that the EU
will never act in other theatres than those prioritized in it – the EU retains its full
flexibility to engage wherever important interests turn out to be at stake. After
all, the ESS identifies the EU as a global actor. But clear priorities for CSDP will
help to focus the strategic planning undertaken by the EUMS, and will consti-
tute an important guideline for capability development, for prioritizing certain
theatres has obvious implications for the types and quantity of required capabil-
ities, including transport and training. Obviously, a CSDP strategy must be a
living document, to be regularly and systematically reviewed. Finally, a more
explicit CSDP strategy would greatly reinforce transparency vis-à-vis parlia-
ments and the public. The EU should indeed not be reluctant, as it now often
seems to be, to state which EU interests an operation is aimed to protect. The
negative connotation which the notion of interests has acquired, is absurd. Pol-
icy is about interests – the important thing is that the EU does not pursue a zero-
sum policy, but seeks to protect its interests in ways that do not harm the legit-
imate interests of others.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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Of course, whenever the EU launches a military operation it must ensure its
chances for success. To that end, ten principles and guidelines for military oper-
ations must always be taken into account when deciding whether or not to inter-
vene.5 The last two of these can be considered the primus inter pares:
1. Absolute clarity on the military tasks to be performed (in order to avoid the
creation of false hope and to prevent mission creep).
2. Rules of engagement allowing the use of force whenever required to achieve
the mission of the operation.
3. Unity of command.
4. Generation of sufficient forces for the objectives (which otherwise have to
be adapted in function of the available forces, or deployment cancelled or
postponed).
5. Guaranteeing the security of one’s own forces without harming that of the
local population.
6. The availability of reserves able to cope with any worst-case scenario.
7. Clear assignment of the non-military tasks (including to other partners
present in theatre).
8. Support of public opinion at home and of the local population on the
ground.
9. Clarity of the desired end-state, the ultimate political objective (the military
objective being only a means to that end).
10. A comprehensive political strategy, a clear political roadmap with concrete
milestones and continuous monitoring of progress.
If all CSDP operations so far have been successful, it is because in spite of the
absence of strategy the EU has attempted to apply these rules of thumb. The
main difficulty has usually been the definition of a clear political end-state; often
the defined objectives did not go beyond the tactical level. These rules apply to
both civilian and military operations; the fifth principle will of course always
have to be assured by the military. The key point is that in crisis management
success is not the result of an addition of political, civilian and military means –
rather than a sum, it is a multiplication: if one factor equals zero, the result
equals zero.
When the EU does decide to intervene, European forces will not necessarily
always operate autonomously. A CSDP strategy will prioritize areas where EU
interests are at stake, and European troops will be called for if they are threat-
ened. But, the specific circumstances of each individual crisis will determine
which organization is chosen as framework for deployment, not the other way
around. EU Member States can thus choose to deploy in an EU, NATO, UN,
5.  Jo Coelmont (2009), End-State Afghanistan. Egmont Paper No. 29. Brussels, Egmont, 2009, p. 23.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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OSCE or ad hoc framework, including of course with its main ally, the US, in
function of the requirements of each specific situation. “The crisis-specific cir-
cumstances are what should determine the preference, and the EU should be
able to discuss openly the best option with its partners, in particular the United
States”, writes the head of the EU’s Crisis Management and Planning Directo-
rate (CMPD), Arnould.6 If necessary, the EU itself ought to be able to launch
and command every type of operation under CSDP. This simply reflects the orig-
inal intention behind the 1999 Headline Goal, i.e. that in the future the EU
should be capable of dealing with a Kosovo-type scenario itself. While the EU
should not seek the occasion just for the sake of it, assuming the responsibility
for a larger-scale operation, even in peacekeeping, would greatly enhance the
credibility of CSDP. For until now, in view of the smaller scale and limited dura-
tion of most operations, CSDP has in that sense been less ambitious than the HG
envisaged.7
In any case, in every possible scenario, the ultimate objective will be political,
not military; a military intervention will always be one instrument among others
(political, economic, social) to achieve a broader political objective. In every
possible scenario, regardless of the military framework chosen, the key Euro-
pean political actor involved will be the EU, hence the need for the EU to include
and prioritize these regions in its security and defence strategy as one essential
component of its holistic foreign policy. For as the key political actor, the EU
cannot afford not to think strategically. Alas, this has been the case all too often,
“not just because of an undue deference to a mighty ally [i.e. the US] but also
because there was no appetite for independent and robust thinking on strategy”
– Strachan’s8 comment about the UK and Afghanistan also applies to the EU as
a whole and to strategy in general.
6.  Claude-France Arnould, “A Noble Ambition”. In: Álvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), What Ambitions for
European Defence in 2020? Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 85.
7.  Jolyon Howorth, The Future of the European Security Strategy: Towards a White Book on European
Defence. Brussels, European Parliament, 2008, p. 2.
8.  Hew Strachan, “The Strategic Gap in British Defence Policy”. In: Survival, Vol. 51, 2009, No. 4, p. 52.13
INDICATIONS OF A CSDP STRATEGY: PRIORITIES FOR 
OPERATIONS
The building-blocks of a CSDP strategy can be gathered by putting together the
EU’s ongoing and past operations with the focus of its foreign policy and with
its vital interests: defence against any military threat to the territory of the
Union; open lines of communication and trade; a secure supply of energy and
other vital natural resources; a sustainable environment; manageable migration
flows; the maintenance of international law and universally agreed rights; pre-
serving the autonomy of the decision-making of the EU and its Member States.
The following areas seem to be a logical set of priorities, in which the EU is in
fact already engaging, but mostly not by far as strategically as it could and
should.
The Neighbourhood
Because of its proximity, the region which the EU calls its “Neighbourhood”
logically appears as a clear priority: Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Med-
iterranean basin, including the Balkans. It contains obvious lines of communi-
cation, as well as sources, of the utmost importance for trade and for the supply
of natural resources, which can be disrupted by crises in the area. It functions as
a passageway for large-scale migration from further beyond to the EU, while
any crisis in the region itself will automatically create refugee streams towards
Europe as well. The proximity in fact means that any regional crisis here will
potentially have a larger direct impact on the territory of the EU than crises in
other parts of the world. Although not likely today, even the spill-over of vio-
lence cannot be entirely excluded. In this region therefore the EU should not
only be active, but should take the lead in safeguarding peace and security,
because vital interests are directly at stake, and because in the region taken as a
whole, the EU is the most powerful actor which potentially can bring the most
leverage to bear. Such power comes with a duty and a responsibility.
It is a heavy duty indeed, for the region is only too crisis-prone as recent history
has shown. The tense situations that have existed since the Israeli-Lebanese war
of 2006 and the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, and of course the everlasting
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to this day can all easily be sparked again into open
warfare. Many other issues at the very least create permanent tensions and in a
worst case scenario might also lead to war within or between States: the still
fragile peace in the Balkans; the “frozen” conflicts on Europe’s eastern border,
e.g. Transnistria; disputes between Mediterranean states, e.g. over the WesternA STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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Sahara; and the unpredictable succession in authoritarian neighbouring coun-
tries, e.g. in Egypt.
The strategic importance of the Neighbourhood is of course recognized in the
ESS, which puts forward “building security in our neighbourhood” as the sec-
ond of three strategic objectives, under which heading it explicitly states that
“Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority” – although that
clear statement did not necessarily always translate into proactive engagement.
The Implementation Report adds that “We need a sustained effort to address
conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel
and the Arab States”. And the EU is of course active in the Neighbourhood,
witness the ongoing civilian missions in Moldova and Ukraine, in Georgia, and
in Palestine, and the deployment of initially up to 8,000 European blue helmets
in Lebanon. The rapid deployments into Georgia and Lebanon especially can be
seen as prime examples of EU actorness.
But if the Neighbourhood is a clear geographic priority, it is less clear in which
types of contingencies the EU should undertake which type of action. How
ambitious and proactive can and should the EU be? Crisis can erupt very sud-
denly in the region, imposing the need for urgent decision-making and hence
advance planning. How would the EU have reacted e.g. if the incident on the
border between Israel and Lebanon on 3 August 2010, killing three Lebanese
soldiers, an Israeli officer and a journalist, had escalated into renewed armed
conflict, trapping European peacekeepers in UNIFIL in the middle? Similarly,
which would be the EU’s options if its civilian observers were to be caught in
Russo-Georgian crossfire? At the same time, the EU must also be proactive, not
just reactive, and think about how CSDP can contribute to preventing crises.
Any intervention in the region would be highly sensitive however, both in the
east, in view of Russian aspirations to maintain a sphere of influence, and in the
south, in view of the heavy connotations which any deployment either to Israel-
Palestine or to an Arab country would entail. These considerations certainly
circumscribe the possibilities for EU action.
In view of the interests at stake and the volatility of the security environment,
the region certainly ought to be prioritized in a CSDP strategy. In view of the
sensitivity, CSDP strategy for the region must be ambitious yet cautious and
EUMS strategic planning will have to translate those priorities into a wide range
of scenarios. Confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), e.g. training
missions, joint exercises and manoeuvres, can contribute to conflict prevention;
many individual Member States have partnerships in this area with neighbour-
ing States, but more coordination at the EU-level would undoubtedly increase
their effectiveness. Engagement in observer missions and peacekeeping opera-A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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tions must certainly be continued, including in the eventuality of an Israeli-Pal-
estinian peace agreement, in which case the EU definitely has to be a part of any
peacekeeping arrangements in order to constitute a force acceptable to all par-
ties. Reinforcement as well as extrication of peacekeeping forces also has to be
planned for, in view of the continued risk of renewal of conflict where they are
currently deployed. Evacuation operations of EU citizens will also have to be
catered for, e.g. in the case of civil strife in a neighbouring country. Renewed
peace enforcement efforts on the Balkans cannot be excluded. In other parts of
the region, peace enforcement can most probably only be envisaged as a contri-
bution to a broad political coalition that involves the primary regional actors,
i.e. in the east Russia, in the south key Arab States, if major negative side-effects
are to be avoided.
Evidently, the Neighbourhood dimension of a CSDP strategy is itself just one
dimension of the comprehensive European Neighbourhood Policy. CSDP can
only be meaningful and indeed successful as part of a broader effort, including
diplomacy, political dialogue, trade and development. The EU’s commitment in
Lebanon is a case in point:9 if the deployment of European peacekeepers is a
good example of actorness, real strategic actorness would require much more
diplomatic follow-up. The reinforcement of UNIFIL can buy some time, but
cannot in itself resolve the conflict, as the August 2010 incidents have shown.
Vice versa, the ENP, although its emphasis is on prevention and stabilization
through a holistic root causes approach, cannot be seen separately from the
politico-military dimension – ENP Action Plans will not lead to many results in
a country involved in conflict with its neighbours or in civil strife. Assuming the
leading responsibility for peace and security in the region is an inextricable part
of the EU’s overall commitment to the Neighbourhood.
Central Asia and the Gulf
Next to the neighbourhood, the ESS and the Report on its implementation single
out only Iran as a priority, and the EU has indeed been “at the forefront of
international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme”, as the Report states.
In Europe the potential development of a nuclear weapons programme by Iran
is not generally seen as a direct threat against EU territory, but it would have
major implications for the balance of power in the Gulf and the Middle East. In
view of its importance to EU vital interests, especially also in terms of trade
routes and natural resources, the question should be debated whether in terms
9.  Alexander Mattelaer, Europe Rediscovers Peacekeeping? Political and Military Logics in the 2006
UNIFIL Enhancement. Egmont Paper No. 34. Brussels, Egmont, 2009.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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of security, the Gulf does not form part of what could in effect be seen as the
“broader Neighbourhood” of the EU, even though formally it falls outside the
scope of the ENP. The same holds true for the Central Asian security complex,
including Afghanistan, where of course EU Member States contribute major
capabilities to the ongoing ISAF operation – be it that by 2010 the prevailing
strategic objective seems to be simply to find a way to leave – and indeed Paki-
stan, in view of its importance to security in the broader region as well as of its
vulnerability.
EU officials have repeatedly confirmed that they do not consider the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by Iran to be a casus belli, but others actors might, and
might act upon that view, in which case the EU will be confronted with the direct
and indirect effects. Furthermore, if in the post-Afghanistan era – now relatively
near at hand – European peace enforcement operations in either region are
highly unlikely, other types of intervention cannot be excluded. In June 2010 e.g.
voices were raised calling on the EU to intervene in the internal unrest in Kyr-
gyzstan, or at the least to provide humanitarian aid. Although in the Gulf and
Central Asia CSDP thus appears to be much more of an ancillary instrument
than it is in the Neighbourhood, it does merit attention in a CSDP strategy and
EUMS strategic planning. The primary focus must however be on the preven-
tive, holistic and multilateral approach.
Africa
Africa is only briefly mentioned in the ESS, notably the Great Lakes Region, but
it has been an important area of focus for CSDP. While the potential impact of
crisis on EU vital interests is less direct, there is an important historical legacy
and consequent sense of responsibility on the part of the former European colo-
nial powers, and there are important other interests at stake. Furthermore, while
other global actors are becoming increasingly active, they are mostly unwilling
to contribute to crisis management on the African continent. The long-term
objective of the EU in the framework of its strategic partnership with the African
Union (AU) is to help it acquiring the capacity to take the lead itself in dealing
with peace and security on the continent. That objective is years in the future
however, which implies that for some time to come the demand for an EU con-
tribution will remain substantial, in view of the many conflicts and crises.
For that contribution to achieve maximal effectiveness and in order to make the
best possible use of available means, prioritization of EU involvement is a con-
ditio sine qua non, for so far CSDP operations in Africa have lacked an under-
lying strategic rationale. The DRC is a case in point. The EU and its MemberA STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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States are among the key political actors involved, notably in the Security Coun-
cil. Both the Commission and individual Member States are among the most
important donors of development aid to the DRC. Two civilian operations are
ongoing in Kinshasa, a police mission and an SSR mission. Their impact is mar-
ginal however, especially of EUSEC, the SSR mission: the armed forces of the
DRC (FARDC) remain ineffective and parts of it still escape the control of the
central government. Twice the EU intervened militarily in the country, in 2003
and 2006, each time at the request of the UN. When however at the end of 2008
the UN for the third time requested an urgent EU military intervention, in order
to create a humanitarian corridor and protect massive numbers of refugees flee-
ing war in the east of the country, the EU did not act. Nor do EU Member States
participate in any significant numbers in the UN force in the country,
MONUSCO (which took over from the previous operation, MONUC, on 1 July
2010), although on the diplomatic front the EU has been key to its development.
Meanwhile, the security situation in the east of the country remains dramatic,
as evidenced by repeated instances of murder and mass rape. The question must
be asked: what are the strategic objectives of EU involvement in Congo? Clearly,
EU engagement in the DRC is everything but holistic.
Crises are unfortunately too common in Africa for the EU to intervene in all of
them, so setting priorities is an absolute necessity. The Congo might actually be
a priority, given the size of the country, its key position in Central Africa, the
international dimension of the ongoing conflict in the east, and the presence of
important natural resources. But then EU engagement must be much more con-
sistent. To the north as well however, the EU might decide to prioritize the sta-
bility of Sudan and its neighbours. If intervening in Darfur does not now seem
possible, in view of the international political context and the heavy commit-
ment to the ongoing operation in Afghanistan, perhaps in the future and as part
of a broad political coalition the EU would be able and willing to intervene itself
in the necessary solution of the conflict in Sudan (or another, similar case) rather
than providing only indirect support. The Sahel as a whole is becoming increas-
ingly important to Europe’s security, in view e.g. of the trafficking going on in
the region. The Horn of Africa could also be an apt priority, as state failure and
the consequent anarchy and lack of viable economy in Somalia are the underly-
ing causes of the crucial piracy problem. Whereas maritime anti-piracy opera-
tions have been successful, they are just combating the symptoms as long as the
situation in Somalia itself is not addressed. The training mission for Somali secu-
rity forces, in Uganda, is only a first modest step to that end. There is as yet no
end to the security problems from which Africa itself suffers first and foremost.
Prioritizing definitely is a challenge therefore, but perhaps the EU would have
more impact if it concentrated its efforts on a limited set of priorities rather than
contributing piecemeal without significant impact.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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Maritime Security
Because of the piracy problem off the Somali coast, maritime security has come
back to the foreground. Through its first naval operation, Atalanta, the EU is
playing a leading role, alongside a NATO operation, a US-led international task
force, and the navies of Russia, India, China, Japan and Malaysia. Atalanta is
highly significant in two regards. First, it undoubtedly concerns vital EU inter-
ests, i.e. safeguarding a key trade route. Second, working closely together with
the navies of notably three (re-)emerging powers is a unique opportunity to
enhance the credibility of CSDP and to demonstrate the scope of EU engage-
ment. The EU, by the way, hosts the coordination meetings between all involved
navies, as the most acceptable actor to all.
Maritime security certainly ought to be among the priorities of CSDP if only
because except to the east, Europe has maritime borders, or what Germond10
calls its “maritime margins”, all of them important as routes for trade and
energy as well as for smuggling and migration, and crucial too in environmental
terms. As Rogers11 forcefully argues, maritime security has moreover to be seen
in a wider geographic context as well and will become increasingly important,
notably in the coastal zone between the Suez Canal and Shanghai:
“[A]s multipolarity increases in the twenty-first century, the Suez-Shang-
hai zone will act as the geographic gateway between the various continen-
tal and coastal powers of Eurasia, meaning that it will continue to grow
as the world’s key area of geoeconomic and geopolitical struggle”.
With 90% of European trade being carried by sea, Rogers argues, the EU cannot
afford just to watch Russia, China and India compete as they build blue water
navies and establish naval bases in this region. The EU must itself show a pres-
ence and must actively contribute to protecting this maritime route, if it wants
to preserve its interests and prevent other powers, or conflict between them,
from dominating or disrupting it. “Britain and France’s existing aereodromes
and naval stations – from Cyprus and Djibouti to Reunion and Diego Garcia –
provide the focal point for this new approach”, Rogers points out.12 In other
words, any CSDP strategy must include a significant maritime dimension. Next
to “Suez to Shanghai”, the Arctic must be an area of focus for CSDP, in view of
10.  Basil Germond, “From Frontier to Boundary and Back Again: European Union’s Maritime Margins”.
In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 15, 2010, No. 1, pp. 39-55.
11.  James Rogers, From Suez to Shanghai: The European Union and Eurasian Maritime Security. Occa-
sional Paper 77. Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 21.
12.  Op. cit., p. 32. For an in-depth analysis, see James Rogers & Luis Simón, The Status and Location of
the Military Installations of the Member States of the European Union and their Potential Role for the
European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Brussels, European Parliament, 2009.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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its increasing navigability and the consequent geopolitical implications.13
Finally, naval assets will be called upon to support crisis management operations
on land.
The United Nations and Collective Security
For the EU, maintaining international law is a vital interest as such, because that
has a direct impact on peace and security and thus on the stability necessary to
the trade power which the Union is. Furthermore, the credibility of its value-
based grand strategy requires that the EU contribute itself when the core values
are at stake, notably basic human rights. It can make that contribution through
the UN, in line with the EU principle of “effective multilateralism”. “Strength-
ening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act
effectively, is a European priority”, the ESS therefore rightly states.
Importantly, the collective security system of the UN can only be legitimate if it
addresses the threats to everyone’s security – too much selectivity undermines
the system. Even though it cannot always play a leading role, the EU must there-
fore also shoulder its share of the responsibility for global peace and security by
playing an active role in the Security Council and by contributing capabilities to
UN, or UN-mandated, crisis management and peacekeeping operations. Here
too, prioritization is in order, for the EU cannot be expected to play a leading
role in every UN operation, nor should it automatically grant every UN request
for military assistance, even though such a request (which can also be forthcom-
ing from a regional organization) ought not to be discarded lightly. A clearer
definition of EU priorities with regard to UN operations could then be the basis
for more concrete cooperation between the UN and the civil-military structures
of the EU, including the EUMS, and would avoid expectations on the part of the
UN which the EU could not meet.
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) could serve as one of the guidelines.
Endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in September 2005, thanks to a
strong EU diplomatic offensive, R2P implies that if a State is unable or unwilling
to protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must
give way to a responsibility to protect on the part of the international commu-
nity. In such cases, the Security Council must mandate intervention, if necessary
13.  Margaret Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability”. In: Survival, Vol. 51, 2009, No. 5, pp.
121-142.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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by military means.14 If the threshold to activate the mechanism is reached any-
where in the world, the EU, in view of its support for the principle and its vital
interest in upholding international law, should contribute. Not mentioned in the
ESS, R2P is included in the Implementation Report – a positive signal. R2P
remains very controversial however; in any case, coercive intervention is but one
dimension of this broad concept, which puts the emphasis on prevention.
Interlocking Priorities
All of these priority areas are of course highly interdependent. Maritime security
is correlated to the security of what Rogers15 dubs “strategic flashpoints” along
the trade routes; hence e.g. Atalanta can only succeed if EUTM Somalia suc-
ceeds. An R2P scenario can manifest itself in Africa or in the Neighbourhood,
or in a region not here deemed to be a priority for CSDP. The ESS does indeed
mention some other regions, e.g. Kashmir and the Korean Peninsula, without
indicating whether the EU ought to play an active role there. Surely, a global
power cannot neglect any region of the globe. The EU’s permanent strategic
reflection must therefore concern the whole of the world, including e.g. Latin
America or the Pacific – but the result of that reflection will not be to prioritize
all of those regions. The EU must monitor all of them and adapt its CSDP strat-
egy in function of their evolving importance to its vital and essential interests.
14.  For an analysis of the concept, see Victoria K. Holt & Tobias C. Berkman, The Impossible Mandate?
Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations. Washington DC, The
Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.
15.  Op. cit., p. 23.21
TYPES OF OPERATIONS: INTERPRETING THE PETERSBERG 
TASKS
Next to the priorities and objectives, a second dimension of a CSDP strategy
concerns the tasks or types of operations which the EU can undertake. For a
long time, there were as many interpretations of the EU’s so-called Petersberg
Tasks as there were Member States. And as decision-making on CSDP issues is
by unanimity, the most narrow interpretation was always likely to win the day.
In the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 43.1 TEU) Member States have now agreed on an
extended definition of the Petersberg Tasks, stating that they:
“[…] shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and res-
cue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and
peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, inclu-
ding peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may
contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third
countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”
As the use of the words “shall include” indicates, this is not a limitative list.
From the legal point of view, the EU can thus launch all types of operations, with
the sole exception of those linked to the collective defence of the territory of the
Member States. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced an obligation of aid and
assistance in case of armed aggression (Art. 42.7 TEU).16 But in view of the
caveats attached to it and given the fact that there is currently no intention to
start planning for that, it appears safe to say that territorial defence will remain
the prerogative of NATO for some time to come – even though of course not all
EU Member States are members of the Alliance. In any case, there is no vital
threat to the territory of the EU in the short to medium term. More importantly,
as the ESS states: “With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be
abroad”. Another innovation is the Solidarity Clause (Art. 222 TFEU), which
allows for the use of CSDP within the territory of the Union, at the request of a
Member State, in case of natural or man-made disasters or terrorist attack,
including in the latter case preventive deployment. The leading role in its imple-
mentation will however be played by the political, legal and police authorities,
with CSDP in a supporting role. While a number of tasks within the territory of
16.  Art. 42.7 TEU reads: “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other
Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in
accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character
of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their
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the EU are added to its remit, one can thus safely assume that the main focus of
CSDP will remain the external security of the EU.
Within this external focus, the Petersberg Tasks comprise all types of operations
necessary to deal with the priorities analyzed in the previous section. The Treaty
wording makes clear that this certainly includes operations at the high end of
the spectrum of violence, i.e. combat operations. The same appears from the five
“illustrative scenarios” that form the basis for the planning assumptions of the
EUMS,17 the first and fourth of which can clearly imply combat:
– “Separation of parties by force” (sustainable for up to 6 months).
– “Stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries”
(including peacekeeping, election monitoring, institution-building, SSR, and
support in the fight against terrorism, sustainable for at least 2 years).
– “Conflict prevention” (including preventive deployment, embargoes, coun-
ter-proliferation and joint disarmament, sustainable for at least 1 year).
– “Evacuation operations” (of up to 10,000 non-combatants, to last up to 120
days).
– “Assistance to humanitarian operations” (sustainable for up to 6 months).
While of course the validity of the Treaty cannot be denied, Member States
remain politically divided over the use of force under the EU flag however. In
practice therefore, in a CSDP context some capitals are reluctant to engage in
anything but low-intensity operations, even though most Member States do put
their forces in harm’s way for national operations and for operations in the
context of NATO or coalitions of the willing (Afghanistan and Iraq being the
prime examples). These political differences came clearly to the fore e.g. on the
occasion of the adoption by the Council at the end of the French Presidency, on
11 December 2008, of a Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities. Outlining
what Europe “should actually be capable” of, “in the years ahead”, this Decla-
ration mentions operations linked to all of the illustrative scenarios except for
the separation of parties by force – the one most obviously involving the use of
force. In the debates in the Council Working Groups it appeared that while some
Member States saw this as going back on the already stated level of ambition,
others actually read the Declaration as enhancing the level of ambition… These
political differences will come to the foreground when the opportunity of a
potential military response to a crisis is discussed in the Council.
In order to avoid these differences from hindering objective decision-making,
the starting point of any strategy for CSDP ought to be the unambiguous recog-
17.  Bastian Giegerich, European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality. Adelphi
Paper No. 397. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009, pp. 19-20.A STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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nition, by all Member States, that the EU can undertake all types of crisis man-
agement operations, across the full spectrum of violence. In other words, every-
thing but collective defence. As the former Chairman of the EU Military Com-
mittee, General Bentégeat states:
“The [C]SDP cannot afford to do without an active military component
which is sufficiently well trained and equipped to carry out combat mis-
sions. If it limits itself to the protection side of the spectrum as regards
crisis management missions, it may no longer be able to fulfil its role of
defending the strategic interests of the Union”.18
The EU should obviously not seek out combat operations just for the sake of
engaging in them – in the ideal scenario, EU strategy manages to avoid the need
for coercive intervention in the first place – but the Union should be prepared to
deliver force when it is necessary. The alternative, i.e. limiting CSDP to the lower
end of the spectrum, makes sense neither politically nor militarily. Politically, it
would deprive the EU of the possibility of action in crises requiring forceful
military intervention, leaving it dependent on others, notably on NATO and
thus mainly on the US, which might not always share the priorities of the EU,
e.g. with regard to Sub-Sahara Africa. Furthermore, as recent experience has
demonstrated, NATO is not the most advisable framework for operations in
each and every context, e.g. in Lebanon – in some cases an operation under the
NATO label can even be politically impossible, e.g. in Georgia. An alternative
platform to launch operations is a necessity therefore. Militarily, all operations,
including those at the lower end of the spectrum, contain a certain risk of esca-
lation. The UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda in 1994 is a dreadful exam-
ple. Neither NATO nor the US can be expected to be always prepared to extri-
cate or reinforce forces deployed on a CSDP operation, hence the EU must itself
be able to take the necessary action under such circumstances.
Allowing the use of force under the EU flag does not run counter to the distinc-
tive grand strategy for “positive power” and constructive engagement for which
the EU has opted.19 The nature of a strategic actor is not just determined by the
mere possession or not of the military instrument, but by the use which it makes
of it. The military is an instrument of confidence-building, conflict prevention,
and post-conflict stabilization, through collaboration programmes, joint exer-
cises and manoeuvres, training missions, SSR and DDR missions, deployment of
observer and peacekeeping missions, and deterrence; an instrument at the sup-
18.  Henri Bentégeat, “What Aspirations for European Defence?” In: Álvaro de Vasconcelos (ed.), What
Ambitions for European Defence in 2020? Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009, p. 98.
19.  Sven Biscop (ed.), The Value of Power, the Power of Values: A Call for an EU Grand Strategy.
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port of humanitarian and rescue operations; as well as an instrument of conflict
resolution and crisis management, by backing up crisis diplomacy with a credi-
ble threat and, as a last resort, by engaging in peace enforcement. Fully inte-
grated as one instrument among others at the service of a holistic grand strategy,
to be used coercively only as a last resort, CSDP is a natural, and necessary, part
of the EU’s foreign policy toolbox.25
THE LEVEL OF AMBITION AND THE SCALE OF THE EFFORT
Once objectives and priorities have been defined and the potential types of oper-
ations agreed, the EU must translate this into the scale of effort required to be
successful. Quantitatively, CSDP is based on the Headline Goal (HG) adopted by
the European Council in Helsinki in 1999. The aim is to be able to deploy up to
an army corps (50 to 60,000 troops), together with air and maritime forces, plus
the required command & control, strategic transport and other support services,
within 60 days, and to sustain that effort for at least one year. That objective is
quite ambitious: if rotation is taken into account, sustaining 60,000 first-line
troops requires 180,000 deployable troops, without counting logistic support.
In addition, since 2007 the EU permanently has two Battlegroups (BGs) of
about 1500 troops on stand-by for rapid response operations. The core of a BG
is a battalion, plus all support services; all capabilities, including command &
control arrangements, are pre-identified. After a training period and certifica-
tion process, each BG is on stand-by for six months and can be deployed within
ten days of a Council decision to launch an operation; sustainability is four
months. Often wrongly perceived – intentionally or unintentionally – as repre-
sentative of CSDP as a whole, the BGs obviously do not replace the HG but
constitute one specific additional capacity to that overall capability objective,
created because of a shortage of rapid response elements. Some continue to see
the “60,000” as an unrealistic objective though, in spite of the renewed empha-
sis put on it by the French Presidency in the second half of 2008 as well as in the
French Livre Blanc.
In reality, the original HG ought to be quite feasible. In 1999, the number of 50
to 60,000 was arrived at by referring back to the launch of KFOR earlier that
year: it was about the number of troops needed to stabilize Kosovo or, earlier,
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today, the EU and its Member States are actively
engaged in many more theatres than in 1999, a trend which is likely to continue
as Europe strengthens its foreign policy, and as the US is looking for burden-
sharing with its European allies. As a result, EU Member States now usually
deploy troop numbers equivalent to the HG or even more, if all ongoing CSDP,
NATO, UN and national operations in which they participate are counted. In
mid-2010 e.g., in addition to some 4,000 troops in CSDP operations, EU Mem-
ber States’ major deployments included some 30,000 troops in ISAF in Afghan-
istan, 7,000 in KFOR in Kosovo and 6,000 as UN blue helmets. In the years
between 2001 and 2010, total numbers were at times much higher still.
This much increased rate of deployment has two major implications however,
which need to be addressed. On the one hand, a lesson learned from past andA STRATEGY FOR CSDP – EUROPE’S AMBITIONS AS A GLOBAL SECURITY PROVIDER
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ongoing operations is that to achieve durable results, operations have to last
ever longer – usually much more than one year. On the other hand, at the current
level of European capabilities, in the event of a crisis occurring in addition to
ongoing operations, EU Member States could not, or only with great difficulty,
deploy significant additional troops, except by improvising (as in case of an
emergency threat to vital interests they would, accepting the increased risks for
the forces deployed which this would entail) or by withdrawing forces from
ongoing operations.
In order to stay in tune with this higher level of activity, the HG has to be inter-
preted broadly. First, the ambition in terms of sustainability ought to be
increased. Today, the aim is to be able to sustain a corps level deployment for at
least one year (authors’ emphasis), which indicates already that longer deploy-
ments may be necessary – that target should now be upgraded explicitly and
planning revised accordingly. Second, the HG should be understood as a deploy-
ment which EU Member States must be able to undertake at any one time over
and above ongoing operations. Then the EU would be able to deal with every
eventuality. Third, the capacity for rapid response must be further increased in
order to allow effective preventive engagement, i.e. at a very early stage.
This broad interpretation of the level of ambition in terms of expeditionary
operations may seem fanciful, but in fact it amounts to nothing more than
adapting to today’s actual level of operational involvement and logically adding
to it the capacity to deal with a crisis in an ongoing operation or in another
theatre. Implicitly, the need to increase the quantitative level of ambition is even
recognized by the EUMS, which has drawn up a number of “concurrency
suites” indicating which of the illustrative scenarios the EU must be able to deal
with simultaneously. As Giegerich20 shows, some of these “concurrency suites”
demand more than 50 to 60,000 troops, as the sole scenario of “separation of
parties by force” can demand as many. The more ambitious interpretation of the
HG cannot seriously be considered unrealistic when measured against the total
number of troops at the disposal of the EU-27, i.e. 1.8 million, and when com-
pared to the US, which manages to deploy more troops out of a smaller total
number. Today, there does not exist an official view, neither in the EU nor in
NATO, about how many of those 1.8 million troops Europe actually needs. In
all probability the result of any analysis will be that Europe does not need that
many uniforms, but can use some additional rapidly deployable troops and
some specific strategic capabilities. The aim should be to increase deployability
and sustainability, perhaps at the price of reducing the overall manpower in
order to allow for the required investment.
20.  Op. cit., p. 21.27
CONCLUSION: CONVERGING TOWARDS AN EU WHITE 
BOOK
Today, military strategy is clearly the least developed dimension of the EU’s
grand strategy. Nevertheless, the key elements of a CSDP strategy already exist.
At the EU level, consensus on the types of operations and on the scale of the
effort has grown considerably, and shared views on the objectives and priorities
are developing. These building-blocks ought now to be combined in a CSDP
strategy.
True, at the Member State level there are differences between the national stra-
tegic cultures. Historically some Member States have less inhibitions to use the
military instrument, others are more averse to any type of intervention (which
is sometimes translated into constitutional constraints). However, convergence
between the national strategic thinking of Member States, notably between
France, Germany and the UK,21 is stronger than they might actually be willing
to admit. Comparing their latest strategic documents, the 2008 Livre Blanc, the
2006 Wei?buch and the 2008 National Security Strategy and its 2009 update,
confirms as much. All three documents envisage combat operations in a multi-
national context, including the Wei?buch, which states explicitly that deploy-
ment for conflict prevention and crisis management is not less intensive and
complex than that in the context of collective defence, the traditional task of the
Bundeswehr. The priorities outlined overlap to a large extent. The Livre Blanc
puts strong emphasis on what it dubs an “arc of crisis” from the Atlantic to the
Indian Ocean, including the Sahel, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the
Gulf, and Afghanistan and Pakistan; on Sub-Saharan Africa; on the European
continent, notably the Balkans and the border zone with Russia; and on the need
to prevent major conflict in Asia. The National Security Strategy identifies four
priorities: Pakistan and Afghanistan; “those parts of Africa suffering from con-
flict, including Darfur, or extremism, including North Africa”; the Middle East;
and Eastern Europe. Only the Wei?buch is less explicit, though it does stress the
vital importance of uninterrupted trade routes.
Although France is the only one to translate it, in its Livre Blanc, into an explicit
call for the adoption of a European white book, on the substance of military
strategy consensus among EU Member States is actually quite strong. All the
elements are present therefore to build a truly shared military or CSDP strategy
for the EU.
21.  See e.g. Alexandra Jonas & Nicolai von Ondarza, Chancen und Hindernisse für die europäische Stre-
itkräfteintegration. Grundlegende Aspekte deutscher, französischer und britischer Sicherheits- und Vertei-
digungspolitik im Vergleich. Wiesbaden, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010.